

### Research update; 3<sup>rd</sup> SARNET meeting

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### Scenario





### SARNET demo

Control loop delay:



By using SDN and containerized NFV, the SARNET agent can resolve network and application level attacks.

From this screen, you can choose your attack and see the defensive response.

### Traffic layers

Toggle the visibility of the traffic layers:

Physical links Traffic flows



### Choose your attack

### Start a Distributed Denial of Service attack from all upstream ISP networks:

UDP DDoS

Start a specific attack originating from one of the upstream ISP networks:

Origin: UNSELECTED -- CLICK ON A CLOUD

CPU utilization Password attack

nfv.services.as100

KIND	nfv
TE#DISKIMAGE	8d8d8a23-c112-421b-baba-49383679dc0b#img-nfv
E#SPECIFICCE	exogeni#XOLarge
ORKERNODEID	uva-nl-w1
#HASRESER	request#Active
ST#INDOMAIN	uvanlvmsite.rdf#uvanlvmsite/Domain/vm
IONEYPOT.PWS	[yamaha enter johnson]
IDS.CPU	0
IDS.PW	[10.100.4.100 10.100.4.101 10.100.4.102]
NFV-CHAIN	[ids honeypot:4.100:4.101:4.102]
CPU-PCT	13

Normal operation

# Sampling



- Sampling
  - Ringbuffer with n values (Default: n=10)
  - New samples arrive asynchronously at about every 0.8 seconds (per metric)
  - Samples for sales from two services are added together, worst case this takes about 1.6 seconds.
- Detect: 30 percent of the samples in the window are below or above treshold.
- Recover: if 70 percent of the samples in the window are above or below treshold.

### Scenario 2

S E ×

Secure Autonomous Response Network SARNET agent metrics

### Network metrics

Bandwidth:

Utilized: 492Mbit/s

### Flows:

TCP: 1663 UDP: 0

### Application metrics

CPU:

Webshop 1: 76% Webshop 2: 32%



### Successful transactions:



Login attempts:





DETECT

### ANALYZE

Known crackers: 10.100.4.100, 10.100.4.101, 10.100.4.102

Latest password attempts: \* star \* little \* chevy

### DECIDE

Deploy IDS to gather additional data Deploy honeypot to divert and capture attack

### RESPOND

Deployed NFV chain: \* ids \* honeypot:4.100:4.101:4.102



# Observables

- DDoS attack
  - Detected if: Abnormal UDP, Sales < thresh(200)
  - Recover if: Sales > thresh
- CPU attack
  - Detected if: CPU > thresh(85)
  - Recovered if: CPU < thresh, Sales > thresh
- PWD attack
  - Detected if: failed > ok OR failed > thresh(20)
  - Recovered if: failed < thresh
- How to determine the right thresholds and observables?
  - ML might help though has its caveats
  - Determining what observables are needed and which ones are important cannot really be automated, unless we have all the data.

### Effectiveness





# Determining effectiveness



- Take the samples for a observable
- Subtract the threshold for that observable
- Invert the samples when needed (for sales)
- Set all negative values to 0
- Use trapezoidial rule to determine integral
- Maybe normalize by dividing by baseline?

### Partial recovery





# **Partial recovery**



- Current method: when variability does not exceed <insert arbritrary value> from the mean.
- Better? Regression line in sample window and look at the slope..
- How long should we wait to call partial recovery.
  - It can still fully recover... eventually?

# UDP filter





## Password attack





## Captcha recovery





← Faster recovery

# Timeout and scalability



• Timeout: After 120 seconds the chosen countermeasure fails.

- Scalability issue?
  - If it takes 2 minutes to try a single solution iterating over 30 solutions takes about an hour (worst case).
  - How about combined solutions.



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